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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2332

INFO USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 BELGRADE 6092

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: IAEA, TECH, ENRG

SUBJ: US NONPROLIFERATION POLICIES: KARDELJ, KRSKO, AND
THE NONALIGNED

REF: A) STATE 189926 B) VIENNA 7704

SUMMARY: A NUCLEAR FUEL EXPORT LICENSE FROM THE NRC WILL BE
NEEDED FOR KRSKO NUCLEAR PLANT BY LATE 1978. INDEED THE
YUGOSLAVS WANT TO BEGIN ROUND TWO OF KRSKO NEGOTIATIONS IN
LATE OCTOBER, THROUGH THEY ARE WILLING TO WAIT A FEW WEEKS UNTIL
U.S. ANTIPROLIFERATION LEGISLATION IS ENACTED. GIVEN SUBSTANTIAL
POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND THE IGNORANCE AND INEXPERIENCE ON TECHNICAL
ISSUES SHOWN THUS FAR BY THE GOY BUREAUCRACY, THERE IS A NEED
TO EDUCATE THE YUGOSLAVS TO ENSURE THEY UNDERSTAND WHAT WE ARE SEEKING.

THE UPCOMING KARDELJ VISIT TO WASHINGTON SHOULD PROVIDE AN
IDEAL TIME TO FURTHER THAT EDUCATION. HE IS THE HIGHEST GOY
OFFICIAL ASSOCIATED WITH INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR POLICIES. HE
WILL INFLUENCE AND PERHAPS EVEN MAKE THE DECISION ON
WHETHER THE GOY WILL PROVIDE THE US ASSURANCES ON RETRANSFER
AND REPROCESSING. IN ANY CASE HE WILL RAISE THE KRSKO ISSUE
HIMSELF.

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EMBASSY SEES A POSSIBILITY OF AN IMPASSE IN
KRSKO NEGOTIATION. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE YET OF GOY WILLINGNESS
AT ACCEPT NEW CONDITIONS. THE US SIDE WILL BE DEALING WITH
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS, HENCE WILL HAVE LESS FLEXIBILITY THAN
DURING ROUND ONE. THOUGH WE AND THE YUGOSLAVS SHARE THE
COMMON OBJECTIVE OF NONPROLIFERATION, THERE ARE REAL POLITICAL

DIFFERENCES DERIVING FROM THE INTERACTION OF THE OBJECTIVE WITH YUGOSLAV INTERNATIONAL POLICIES ON DISARMAMENT, RIGHTS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS TO NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, AND THE LEGITIMACY OF CONDITIONS SET OUTSIDE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. THUS THE EMBASSY SEGGETS THAT THE USG TAILOR, NOT THE SUBSTANCE OF ITS POLICY, BUT ITS TACTICS IN APPROACHING YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHER DEVELOPING NATIONS BY: (1) STRESSING CONTINUED COMMITMENT OF THE USG TO USING EXISTING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, (2) LOWERING THE VISIBILITY OF THE CONSULTATION AMONG NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS, AND (3) NEGOTIATING WILL FULL OPENNESS TO MODERATE THE SUSPICIONS OF THE NON-NUCLEAR NATIONS AND HOPEFULLY TO GAIN THE SUPPORT OF WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS: THAT KARDELJ RECEIVE A CANDID HIGH-LEVEL BRIEFING ON U.S. NONPROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICIES AND THAT THE USG INVITE THE GOY TO SEND A SMALL DELEGATION TO WASHINGTON IN LATE OCTOBER OR EARLY NOVEMBER TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND NONPROLIFERATION. END SUMMARY.

1. THIS REPORT ANALYSES YUGOSLAV INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR POLICIES AND NEGOTIATING TACTICS. ITS PURPOSES ARE TO CONVEY THE EMBASSY'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BRIEFING KARDELJ ON U.S. NUCLEAR POLICIES DURING HIS PROPOSED VISIT TO WASHINGTON, TO PREPARE FOR THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON U.S. NUCLEAR EXPORTS FOR KRSKO, AND TO SUGGEST TACTICS TO MAKE U.S. NUCLEAR EXPORT AND NONPROLIFERATION POLICIES CONFIDENTIAL

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MORE ACCEPTABLE TO DEVELOPING NATIONS LIKE YUGOSLAVIA.

2. NONPROLIFERATION AND YUGOSLAV INTERNATIONAL POLICY. THE YUGOSLAVS SHARE WITH US A FIRM COMMITMENT TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TO MAINTAIN THE STRENGTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FOR SAFEGUARDING NUCLEAR EXPORTS. DIFFERENCES ON NUCLEAR POLICY ARISE, HOWEVER, FROM OTHER OBJECTIVES OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL POLICY: DISARMAMENT, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF NONALIGNED

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NATIONS, AND INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SUPERPOWERS.

3. THE YUGOSLAVS LINK DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION INTIMATELY, GIVING PRECEDENCE TO DISARMAMENT. ALTHOUGH THE YUGOSLAVS WERE EARLY ADHERENTS TO THE NPT, THEY HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY CRITICAL OF THE TREATY BECAUSE OF THE PERCEIVED FAILURE OF THE US AND USSR TO FULFILL THEIR TREATY COMMITMENT TO MOVE TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. THE CONTINUED POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY A FEW NATIONS IN SEEN AS ENCOURAGING OTHER NATIONS TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISIONS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MOREOVER EXISTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE CONSIDERED A MENACE TO WORLD WELFARE. ACCORDING TO KARDELJ, "THE DANGER FROM EXISTING ATOMIC BOMBS IS MUCH GREATER THAN THE DANGER FROM HYPOTHETICAL ONES," -- A COMMON YUGOSLAV REFRAIN UNDER VARIOUS FORMS. A CONCRETE EXAMPLE OF THE LINKAGE THE YUGOSLAVS MAKE BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION IS THEIR SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO INCLUDE NONPROLIFERATION ON THE AGENDA OF THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT, WHICH IS THE MAJOR YUGOSLAV INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE OF RECENT YEARS.

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4. THE YUGOSLAVS OPPOSE MEASURES BEYOND EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS TO RESTRICT THE FLOW OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING NATIONS. THEY CLAIM THAT THE DEVELOPING NATIONS HAVE A LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND IF DEPRIVED OF ACCESS, WILL DEVELOP THEIR OWN CAPABILITIES. AGAIN ACCORDING TO KARDELJ, "EITHER THE COUNTRIES WHICH POSSESS NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY WILL CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDE AND ENABLE FREE TRANSFER, THAT IS, FULL FREEDOM IN THE UTILIZATION OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES IN ALL COUNTRIES, WITH AN EFFICIENT INTERNATIONAL CONTROL SO THAT NO NUCLEAR RAW MATERIAL WOULD BE USED FOR THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONS, OR THE INDEPENDENT NONALIGNED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WILL FIND OUT WAYS TO PROVIDE THEMSELVES WITH NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY BY THEIR OWN STRENGTH. THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE IS NO DOUBT WORSE THAN THE FIRST ONE FOR IT WOULD DISTURB THE SYSTEM OF PROHIBITION OF PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL AND BESIDES IS ECONOMICALLY NOT RATIONAL."

5. FINALLY, THE YUGOSLAVS SUSPECT THAT THE US AND OTHER NUCLEAR EXPORTERS ARE USING NONPROLIFERATION MEASURES AS A BLIND TO PROMOTE THEIR ECONOMIC INTERESTS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED POLITIKA OF SEPTEMBER 5 STATED "CARTER DOES NOT PREVENT PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM ONLY BECAUSE OF THE DANGER TO THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT AND BECAUSE OF PROTECTION OF THE WORLD AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPON PROLIFERATION, BUT ABOVE ALL BECAUSE HE WISHES TO PRESERVE THE AMERICAN MONOPOLY IN THE PRODUCTION OF EQUIPMENT AND FUEL FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS." YUGOSLAV OFFICIALS HAVE NOT GONE SO FAR, BUT THEY RARELY MISS AN OPPORTUNITY TO CRITICIZE THE LONDON CLUB, CLAIMING THAT IT IS AN ATTEMPT TO INSTITUTIONALIZE A PERMANENT MONOPOLY ON NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. MOREOVER, THEY PERCEIVE UNILATERAL U.S. ACTION AND THE WORKINGS OF CONFIDENTIAL

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THE LONDON CLUB AS EXCLUDING THE NONALIGNED NATIONS FROM DECISIONS CONSIDERED CRITICAL TO THEIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND AS UNDERCUTTING ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS WHERE YUGOSLAVIA, BY VIRTUE OF ITS POSITION OF LEADERSHIP AMONG THE NONALIGNED HAS AN INFLUENTIAL VOICE.

6. KRSKO: ROUND ONE.

THE USG AIDE MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 3, 1976 REQUESTING APPROVAL RIGHTS ON RETRANSFER AND REPROCESSING TOUCHED A HYPERSENSITIVE NERVE: THE NEED TO EXERT INDEPENDENCE FOR SUPERPOWERS AND NOT TO ACCEDE TO PRESSURE TACTICS. BOTH SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED, IT PUT THE YUGOSLAVS ON THE DEFENSIVE. CLAIMING THEIR INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY WAS BEING INFRINGED, THEY REFUSED TO ACCEPT ANY ADDITIONAL COMMITMENTS. WITHIN THAT CONTEXT, HOWEVER, THEY NEGOTIATED IN GOOD FAITH. THEY WERE WILLING TO MAKE A RESTATEMENT OF EXISTING COMMITMENTS IN THE IAEA. THEY FLOATED COMPROMISE FORMULAS. THEY WERE UNFAILINGLY CORDIAL. STILL, THEY DID NOT BUDGE ON THE QUESTION OF NEW COMMITMENTS.

7. ANOTHER CHARACTERISTIC SHOWN BY THE GOY OFFICIALS DURING THE KRSKO NEGOTIATIONS WAS IGNORANCE AND INEXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICIES. THUS OUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL RIGHTS PASSED THROUGH THE GOY BUREAUCRACY, UNPROCESSED AND UNMEDIATED, TO THE

HIGHEST POLITICAL LEVEL. HERE IT WAS JUDGED PURELY IN THE

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BROAD POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE SKETCHED ABOVE. THROUGHOUT THE ENSUING NEGOTIATIONS, YUGOSLAV OFFICIALS SHOWED LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OF EXACTLY WHAT WE WERE SEEKING, ONLY THAT WE WERE SEEKING SOMTHING NEW. THE OUTSIDE TECHNICAL ADVISORS WHICH THEY CALLED IN FOR ASSISTANCE TENDED TO BE OUT OF DATE (NUCLEAR RESEARCH HAS BEEN DECLINING SINCE THE EARLY 1960'S). THE FOREIGN OFFICE, ITSELF, HAD ONLY ONE OFFICIAL WITH EVEN A RUDIMENTARY GRASP OF NUCLEAR POLICY AND HE DIED THIS SUMMER. FORTUNATELY, IT IS MOVING TO CORRECT THIS GAP BY APPOINTING A HIGH-LEVEL COUNSELOR FOR NUCLEAR AFFAIRS, EDO KLJUN, FORMERLY AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY.

8. A THIRD CHARACTERISTIC WAS THE FAILURE TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY NO MATTER WHAT THEY PROMISED. EACH TIME THE KRSKO INTEREST WOULD WANE IN THE MEDIA THEY WOULD KEEP IT ALIVE BY DELIBERATE IF LOW-KEY LEAKS. OUR IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE YUGOSLAVS FELT SO CONFIDENT THAT THEY WERE THE "WRONGED" PARTY THAT THEY USED THE LEAKS IN AN ATTEMPT TO EMBARASS AND THUS PRESSURE THE USG.

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9. KARDELJ VISIT: CARDS ON THE TABLE.

FROM THE ABOVE IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE WILL BE A GREAT NEED FOR EDUCATION IF OUR NEW REQUIREMENTS ON FUTURE NUCLEAR EXPORTS ARE TO BE ACCEPTED BY THE YUGOSLAVS. THE KARDELJ VISIT OFFERS THE BEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERTAKE THIS EDUCATION AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL IN THE GOY. NOT ONLY IS KARDELJ A MODERATE AND FROM SLOVENIA, WHERE KRSKO IS SITED, BUT ALSO HE IS THE ONLY HIGH YUGOSLAV OFFICIAL CLOSELY AND PUBLICLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE ISSUE OF NONPROLIFERATION. (IN ANY CASE, THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAS SAID KARDELJ WILL RAISE THE KRSKO ISSUE.)

10. EMBASSY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT BOTH PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT IMPRESS UPON KARDELJ THAT:

- A) THE USG IS SINCERELY WORKING TOWARD LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR ARMS;
- B) THE USG IS NOT SEEKING TO RESTRICT ACCESS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS TO THE BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY;
- C) THE USG IS NOT USING NONPROLIFERATION CONDITIONS TO ADVANCE ITS COMMERCIAL INTERESTS WHICH MAY SUFFER AS A RESULT;
- D) BUT THE ADMINISTRATION IS SINCERE AND DETERMINED IN PURSUING ITS NONPROLIFERATION GOALS;
- E) THIS DETERMINATION IS SHARED BY CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (IDEALLY KARDELJ'S VISIT TO CONGRESS SHOULD REINFORCE THIS), HENCE US POLICIES WILL NOT WAVER.

THE DETAILS OF US NONPROLIFERATION POLICIES COULD BE HANDLED BRIEFLY DURING SCHEDULED MEETINGS BY SOMEONE INTIMATELY INVOLVED WITH THE ISSUE.

11. FOR HIS PART, KARDELJ WILL PERCEIVE OUR NUCLEAR POLICY IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT DESCRIBED ABOVE. HE WILL AGREE THAT
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YUGOSLAVIA DOES NOT WISH TO FOREGO AT THIS TIME AND WITHOUT ADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE FUTURE RIGHTS TO A VALUABLE ENERGY RESOURCE. PROBABLY HE WILL NEITHER BE CONVINCED BY NOR EVEN UNDERSTAND THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ARGUMENTS ON REPROCESSING PLUTONIUM RECYCLE, AND THE FAST BREEDER. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, HE MAY ANNOUNCE THE GOY ACCEPTANCE OF THE US INVITATION TO THE ORGANIZING CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION.

12. KRSKO: ROUND TWO.

THE YUGOSLAVIA WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN THE SECOND ROUND OF TALKS ON KRSKO IN LATE OCTOBER OR EARLY NOVEMBER, IN EITHER

WASHINGTON OR BELGRADE. THEY STRESS THAT THEY DO NOT WANT A REPETITION OF THE FIRST ROUND WHERE THEY FELT THEY WERE NEGOTIATING UNDER SEVERE TIME PRESSURE. THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO WAIT A FEW WEEKS TO ENABLE THE ANTIPROLIFERATION BILL TO BE ENACTED. FORTUNATELY THERE IS ADEQUATE TIME. ACCORDING TO THE YUGOSLAVS AND THE WESTINGHOUSE PROJECT MANAGER, A NUCLEAR FUEL LICENSE WILL BE NEEDED BY LATE 1978. THE FUEL ELEMENTS MUST BE ON SITE BY EARLY 1979, IF THE PROJECT IS NOT TO BE FURTHER DELAYED BEYOND ITS SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE OF DECEMBER 1979. GIVEN THE TWO YEARS IT TOOK FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE EQUIPMENT LICENSE, WE OWE THE YUGOSLAVS TIMELY CONSIDERATION OF THEIR LICENSE APPLICATION, WHICH WILL PROBABLY BE MADE THIS AUTUMN. IF ACTION IS NOT FORTHCOMING, WE SHOULD AT LEAST MAINTAIN A CONTINUED DIALOGUE.

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13. THE EMBASSY SEES THE SECOND ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON KRSKO BEING JUST AS TOUGH AS THE FIRST. WE HAVE NO REASONS TO BELIEVE THE YUGOSLAVS WILL BE ANY MORE WILLING TO GIVE THE US APPROVAL RIGHTS ON REPROCESSING AND RETRANSFER. THEY MAY CLAIM OUR REQUEST FOR A BILATERAL AGREEMENT UNDERCUTS THE LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. THE US NEGOTIATORS WILL BE DEALING FROM STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS, HENCE WILL HAVE LESS FLEXIBILITY THAN ON THE FIRST ROUND.

14. TO MAKE OUR REQUIREMENTS MORE ACCEPTABLE, WE SHOULD STRESS THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF OUR POLICIES AND PLAY DOWN THE BILATERAL ASPECTS. AS A SEMI-OFFICIAL YUGOSLAV REVIEW CONCLUDED OPTIMISTICALLY, "THIS IS NO LONGER STRICTLY A BILATERAL PROBLEM BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND YUGOSLAVIA, BUT RATHER A BROADER WORLD PROBLEM, IT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT APPROPRIATE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FORMULAS WILL BE FOUND IN TIME..." WE SHOULD FRAME OUR APPROACH AS AN ATTEMPT TO STRENGTHEN EXISTING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (IAEA AND NPT) RATHER THAN IMPOSING NEW
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CONDITIONS OF THE USG OR THE NUCLEAR SUPPLYING NATIONS. WE SHOULD STRESS THE GRAVE RESPONSIBILITY OF A NUCLEAR EXPORTING NATION. FINALLY WE SHOULD REMOVE THE ELEMENTS OF OUR POLICIES SEEN AS DISCRIMINATORY TO THE DEVELOPING NATIONS.

15. U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICIES AND THE LDCS. THE FIRST PHASE OF THE EVOLVING US NONPROLIFERATION POLICY WAS AIMED AT A SMALL GROUP OF SUPPLIER NATIONS. EXCLUSIVENESS AND CONFIDENTIALITY WERE BOTH POSSIBLE AND ADVISABLE. NOW, HOWEVER, THE USG MUST DEAL WITH A FAR LARGER NUMBER OF NUCLEAR IMPORTING NATIONS INCLUDING SOME OF THE MOST TRUCULENT DEVELOPING NATIONS. NEW TACTICS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED THAT WILL MAKE OUR POLICIES MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD. AMONG THEM:

16. FIRST, YUGOSLAVIA AND PROBABLY OTHER DEVELOPING NATIONS WOULD PREFER THE IAEA AS THE MAJOR FORUM FOR NEGOTIATING NUCLEAR EXPORT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS. THUS WE APPLAUD THE APPROACHES OF THE DEPARTMENT (REF A) AND USIAEA (REF B) AND IN PARTICULAR SUPPORT USIAEA'S BELIEF THAT THE US SHOULD EVIDENCE ITS INTENTION OF CONTINUING TO USE THE IAEA AS A VEHICLE FOR NUCLEAR EXPORTS. HOWEVER, CONTRARY TO THE IMPLICATION IN DEPARTMENTS'S REF A, EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT ANY GENERALIZED ATTEMPT TO GAIN IAEA ACCEPTANCE OF OUR NEW CONDITIONS IN PAST AND FUTURE TRILATERAL AGREEMENTS WILL BE "HIGHLY VISIBLE" (PARA 5) AND "VIEWED IN A BROAD POLITICAL CONTEXT" (PARA 8). BOTH YUGOSLAVIA AND MEXICO HAVE TOO MUCH AT STAKE TO ALLOW THE US TO ADOPT PROCEDURES IN PARA 6 AND 7 WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE DEBATE. THUS WE ALSO SUPPORT IAEA'S RECOMMENDATION OF FACING THE ISSUE SQUARELY AND ACROSS THE BOARD (REF B, PARA 5).

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17. SECOND, SOME CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO LOWERING THE VISIBILITY OF THE CONTINUING CONSULTATION AMONG THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS, PERHAPS BY DROPPING THE LONDON CLUB FORMAT -- IF THAT HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN DONE. THE PERCEPTION OF A "CLUB" OF ADVANCED POWERS COALESCE THE OPPOSITION OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS AND FEEDS THEIR IDEOLOGICAL FANCIES THAT THE ADVANCED NATIONS ARE CONSPIRING TO SLOW THE GROWTH OF THE THIRD WORLD AND TO MONOPOLIZE MODERN MEANS OF PRODUCTION.

18. THIRD, WE SHOULD DROP THE CONFIDENTIALITY ADOPTED DURING THE FIRST ROUND OF KRSKO AND PROCEED HERE AND ELSEWHERE ON THE BASIS OF OPENNESS. FOR ONE THING CONFIDENTIALITY WILL NOT WORK. THERE ARE TOO MANY PLAYERS AND TOO MUCH IS KNOWN. FOR ANOTHER IT IS PROBABLY A POOR NEGOTIATING TACTIC CONFIRMING THE IMPORTER'S SENSE OF BEING UNJUSTLY IMPOSED UPON. IN ADDITION IT MAY BE TIME TO SEEK SUPPORT OF WORLD OPINION FOR OUR NONPROLIFERATION POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES. ON PERHAPS NO OTHER ISSUE COULD THE US ACHIEVE GREATER ACCEPTANCE BY THE POPULATIONS OF MOST NATIONS. INFORMED WORLD OPINION MAY IN THE LONG RUN BE OUR BEST ALLY IN ACHIEVING OUR NONPROLIFERATION GOALS.
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